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Abstract
A serious weakness in the recently proposed Chen-Hsu-Harn group
authentication and group key establishment scheme is described. A
simple attack against the group key establishment part of the scheme
is given, which casts doubt on the viability of the scheme.
1 Introduction
A recent article by Cheng, Hsu and Harn proposed a combined (group)
membership authentication and key establishment scheme. The scheme is
claimed to be lightweight and hence suitable for wireless sensor networks
(WSNs).
There is a very extensive literature on group key establishment schemes,
many of which at least provide implicit authentication of the group members.
The interested reader is referred to Boyd, Mathuria and Stebila [1]. It is
far from clear whether, even it was secure (and it is not, as we describe
below), the Chen-Hsu-Harn scheme offers any advantages over the state of
the art, since the only comparison provided is with schemes using public key
cryptography.
We describe a serious weakness in the Cheng-Hsu-Harn scheme [2]. The
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly
outline the operation of the scheme; this is followed in Section 3 by some
brief observations on its functioning. The attack is described in Section 4,
and concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
1
2 The scheme
The scheme involves a universally trusted Membership Registration Cen-
tre (MRC ), which provides information to each of n participating entities
{U1, U2, . . . , Un}. This information enables any subset of the entities to au-
thenticate each other ‘as a group’, and also to establish a shared secret key
which is not available to participating entities not in the subset. The scheme
uses arithmetic in GF(p), the finite field of p elements, for some prime p > n.
No other requirements on p are specified.
The scheme has five main stages, which we next briefly enumerate. The
first stage is used to set up all the participants, and is only performed once.
The remaining four steps are performed whenever a subset of entities wish
to authenticate and establish a shared key. The reader is directed to the
Cheng et al. paper [2] for the details — the notation used below is exactly
as used in that paper.
0. Token generation This preliminary stage, performed once before ac-
tive use of the scheme, involves the MRC generating and distribut-
ing a pair of ‘shares’ (si(y), si(x)) to each authorised participant Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), where si(y) is a polynomial of degree h−1 over GF(p) and
si(x) is a polynomial of degree t−1 over GF(p), and where h > 2t−2.
1. Pairwise key generation In this first operational stage, the members
of a ‘group’, i.e. a subset {Uv1 , Uv2 , . . . , Uvm} ⊆ {U1, U2, . . . , Un}, com-
pute pairwise secret keys ki,j for each other using their shares. In fact,
this step could be performed just once as part of the initialisation
process, since the pairwise keys will always be the same.
2. Group authentication This involves the members of the group mutu-
ally authenticating each other using the pairwise secret keys ki,j. After
this step has completed each participant is confident that all members
of the group agree on which entities are in the group.
3. Group key establishment This involves a further exchange amongst
group members, as a result of which they agree on a shared secret key.
In this exchange, information sent between group members is always
encrypted using a pairwise shared secret key (as established in step 1).
The group key is computed as the exclusive-or of values received from
other group members.
4. Group key authentication This final stage, involving yet another ex-
change, is designed to give assurance that all members of the group
agree on the shared secret key.
In this paper we describe an attack on the final two stages of the scheme,
i.e. the group key establishment and group key authentication stages.
2
3 Some observations
Before describing the attack, we make some minor observations on the op-
eration of the scheme.
• There is no direct link between the group authentication stage and the
group key establishment stage, except for the set of identities of the
participants in the ‘group’.
• The nature of the encryption function E used in group key estab-
lishment is not specified. We assume here that it is instantiated as
authenticated encryption (to avoid attacks that might be possible if
encrypted values could be manipulated).
• The scheme involves computing the bitwise-exclusive-or of values com-
puted module p. We assume here that prior to applying the exclusive-
or operation the values are converted from integers to bit strings.
4 An attack on group key establishment
4.1 Attack scenario, attack model and attack objective
We suppose that a set of m (m ≤ n) participants {Uv1 , Uv2 , . . . , Uvm} have
successfully completed the group authentication stage.
We further suppose that an (insider) adversary Uvk (1 ≤ k ≤ m) controls
the broadcast channel with respect to ‘victim’ participant Uvj (1 ≤ j ≤ m,
j 6= k), i.e. the adversary can (a) prevent messages sent by other legitimate
participants from reaching Uvj , and (b) send messages to Uvj on this chan-
nel that appear to have come from other legitimate participants. Since the
protocol makes no assumptions about the trustworthiness of the commu-
nications channels, this assumption is legitimate. Indeed, if the broadcast
channel was completely trustworthy, then much of the protocol would not
be needed.
The objective of the adversary is to make the victim accept a key that
is different to the key that is accepted by all other members of the set
{Uv1 , Uv2 , . . . , Uvm}. This would appear to negate the purpose of the group
key authentication stage, which is (presumably) all about enabling all mem-
bers of the ‘group’ to verify that they share the same key.
4.2 Subverting group key establishment
The adversary Uvk first chooses a key K
∗ which it wishes the victim Uvj
to (wrongly) accept as the shared group key. The adversary Uvk allows all
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messages sent by other participants to reach their destinations correctly.
However, the adversary sends two different versions of its own message:
• it sends an encrypted version of the ‘correct’ value qvk to all partici-
pants Uvs (1 ≤ s ≤ m) except for the victim Uvj ;
• it sends an encrypted version of the value qvk ⊕K ⊕K
∗ to the victim
Uvj , where K is the ‘correct’ shared group key.
Note that the adversary will need to wait until it has received all the values
qvi (i 6= k) before it can send the value to the victim, since it must compute
the group key K before sending the value.
As a result of the above steps, all participants except for the victim Uvj will
share the ‘correct’ group key K. However, the victim will believe that the
group key is K∗. We observe in passing that:
• the adversary knows K and K∗;
• this part of the attack does not require the adversary to manipulate
the broadcast channel.
4.3 Breaking group key authentication
We conclude the attack by showing how the adversary can manipulate the
authentication process so that all participants believe the protocol has con-
cluded successfully. The authentication process requires each participant
to broadcast H(K||L) where H is a cryptographic hash function, K is the
group secret key that has just been established, and L is the sum of values
broadcast (in cleartext) at the beginning of the key establishment process.
To complete the attack the adversary needs to take control of the broadcast
channel to and from the victim Uvj . The victim will broadcast H(K
∗||L) —
the adversary suppresses this and masquerades as the victim to broadcast
H(K||L). All other participants will broadcast H(K||L); the adversary
prevents these messages reaching the victim, and instead sends the victim
‘fake’ broadcasts of H(K∗||L).
This completes the attack — all participants except the victim will believe
that K is shared by the group, and the victim will believe K∗ is shared by
the group.
5 Concluding remarks
We have demonstrated a simple attack which completely negates the objec-
tives of the protocol. This means that the protocol should not be used.
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Fundamentally, the fact that the authors have not provided rigorous proofs
of security for the scheme means that attacks such as that described here
remain possible. It would have been more prudent to follow established
wisdom and only publish a scheme of this type if a rigorous security proof had
been established. Similar remarks apply to the all-too-often misconceived
attempts to fix broken schemes, unless a proof of security can be devised for
a revised scheme. Achieving this in an efficient way seems difficult for this
scheme.
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